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Commercial Transactions and Personal
Property-1963 Tennessee Survey
John A. Spanogle, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION





Obviously, the biggest event in the Tennessee law of commercial
transactions this year was the enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code [hereinafter referred to as the U.C.C.]. That statute became
effective in this state on July 1, 1964. Its effect on the prior Tennes-
see law is discussed in great detail elsewhere in this issue,' and need
not be re-examined here.
It should also be pointed out that the enactment of the U.C.C.
required some modifications in the criminal statutes relating to security
agreements. In particular, executing a second security agreement
covering personalty, without disclosing a prior security agreement
covering the same property, will now be punishable under
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-1936; and removing out-
side the state or disposing of any personalty subject to a
security agreement will now be punishable under Tennessee
Code Annotated sections 39-1956 and 39-1957. These sections
supplant Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-1933, -38, -54 and -55
in their respective areas on the effective date of the U.C.C.2
There were also three commercial law cases decided during the
year-all of which were decided by the western section court of
appeals. One case involved a determination of when the risk of loss
during shipment passes to the buyer under a delivery contract. Two
other cases involved the extent of warranty protection available to
buyers. Most of the issues decided in these cases are also covered
by express language in the U.C.C., which would modify, and in one
case overturn, the holdings of the court.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. Bigham, Tennessee Law and the Sales Article of the Uniform Commercial Code,
17 VAND. L. REV. 873 (1964); White, Tennessee Law and the Secured Transaction
Article of the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 VAND. L. REv. 835 (1964). See also,
Spanogle, The Bank-Depositor Relationship-A Comparison of the Present Tennessee
Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 VAND. L. REv. 79, (1962); Notes, 22
TrNN. L. 11Ev. 776-872 (1953).
2. These sections have been amended to apply only to contracts entered into before
Jly 1, 1964, the effective date of the U.C.C.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
II. RISK OF Loss DURING SHIPMENT
At 5 A.M. on Sunday morning, Carrier delivered goods in leaky
barges to Buyer's place of business, and tied these barges up at
Buyer's dock. Earlier that night, Carrier had notified Buyer's night-
watchmen that the barges would arrive; and after arrival Carrier's
crewmen had talked to a watchman about the leak; but Carrier had
then left without giving further notification to Buyer of the arrival of
the goods. By 2 P.M. Sunday both barges had sunk. Parish & Parish
Mining Co. v. Serodino, Inc.3 presented the issue of who bad the risk
of loss at that time, Buyer or Seller. A "destination" contract was
involved. It specified that the purchase was F.O.B. barge at Buyer's
terminal, and further provided that "title to the goods and risk of loss
or damage shall remain in [Seller] until delivery in acceptable condi-
tion by the carrier at Destination."4
The court of appeals held that the risk of loss was still on Seller
at the time the barges sank. In so doing, it alluded to three possible
grounds for its holding: (1) In order to "deliver" the goods, Carrier
must properly notify Buyer of their arrival, and this requires notifica-
tion of some employee who has authority to accept the goods. Since
Carrier notified only watchmen who had no such authority, the goods
were never delivered, and the risk of loss could not pass to Buyer
under the terms of the contract. (2) Title to the goods, and risk of
their loss, does not pass until the goods have been accepted by Buyer.
Buyer is not deemed to have accepted until he has had a reasonable
opportunity to inspect. Since Buyer never had such an opportunity
in this case, the risk of loss did not pass. (3) Since the barge was
leaking, the goods were delivered in an unacceptable condition, so
that the risk of loss could never pass to Buyer.
From the written opinion, it is not clear whether any one of these
grounds was relied upon by the court as determinative of the case.5
The first ground is unobjectionable and a complete answer to the
issue before the court,6 and perhaps the court should not have con-
3. 372 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963).
4. Id. at 437, 438.
5. See Id. at 447.
6. F. E. Grauwiller Transp. Co. v. Gallager Bros. S & G Corp., 173 F.2d 708
(2d Cir. 1949); Dean v. Vaccaro & Co., 39 Tenn. 488 (1859). Seller appears to have
argued that notification was shown by the facts that: (1) one watchman sent another
down to the docks at the time of arrival; and (2) Carrier tied up the barges at their
usual place of mooring. The first would seem irrelevant if neither watchman was a
proper person to notify. If the second fact showed a custom on the part of Buyer
to accept delivery in this manner, it would show a completed delivery and shift the
risk to Buyer. The court apparently did not find such a custom but did not, however,
discuss the point. 372 S.W.2d at 445.
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sidered the alternative grounds. The second' and third8 grounds raise
very disturbing questions of statutory and contractual interpretation
under the Uniform Sales Act [hereinafter referred to as Sales Act].'
These questions were ignored by the court however.
What processes of analysis the court should have followed under
the Sales Act became moot on July 1, 1964, when the U.C.C. became
effective. Under that statute, the same result would be obtained, but
neither of the alternative grounds would be available. Under the
contract, the risk of loss does not pass until there has been a delivery.
To accomplish delivery, section 2-503(1) requires that the Seller
put and hold the goods at the destination and give the Buyer "any
notification reasonably necessary to enable him to take delivery."10
Section 1-207(27) requires that such notification be given to the
individual employee who is conducting that transaction, and this con-
dition is not satisfied by notifying a watchman." Thus "delivery"
would not have occurred, so that under the contract terms the risk
of loss could not have passed to Buyer before the barges sank. Even
without the contract language, the U.C.C. would hold Seller respon-
sible. The contract is, by its terms, a destination contract. Under such
a contract, Seller is responsible until Carrier has tendered delivery,
which again requires notification to the individual conducting the
transaction. 2
7. The court continually asserted that both delivery and acceptance were conditions
precedent to passing the risk of loss to Buyer, 372 S.W.2d at 443. This seems to
ignore the plain wording of the contract clause which shifts the risk "upon delivery."
Delivery alone does not require acceptance, as the authorities quoted by the court itself
show. Nor did the court find any right of inspection in the contract language. Id. at 446.
If the contract is to be ignored, there are still problems of statutory interpretation
involved. There seems to be a split of authority under the Sales Act on the point
at which title passes under an F.O.B. contract. 46 AM. JuR., Sales § 444 (1943), and
authorities cited therein. The better reasoned cases hold that title to identified goods
does not pass until the goods are accepted, because there has been no prior assent to
any appropriation of the goods to the contract. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1219, rules 4(1),
5 (1956). But cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1219, rule 4(2) (1956). Such a result is
necessary to a proper resolution of other incidents of title to the goods under the
Sales Act. See 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 472, at 74 (rev. ed. 1948). It is not necessary
to a proper allocation of the risk of loss, however, and is changed under the
U.C.C. See note 13 infra and text following.
8. This ground was used primarily as a method of distinguishing a prior Alabama
case. 372 S.W.2d at 445-47. Therefore, it may not be an alternative ground for the
holding. It was, however, originally posed as an alternative ground when the court
stated the issues in the case. Id. at 440. It appears that the leak did not damage the
goods, or make them non-conforming. Therefore, the goods do not seem to have
been "unacceptable" in the sense that Buyer could rightfully refuse to accept them.
If the court used "unacceptable" in a different sense, it did not indicate what its new
definition was, or what are the limitations on the new usage.
9. TENx. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1201 to -1277 (1956). These sections are repealed as
of July 1, 1964.
10. TNN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-503 (1) (1956).
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-207(27) (repl. vol. 1964).
12. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-509 ( 1) (b) (repl. vol. 1964).
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Neither alternative ground will be available to the court, however,
because the U.C.C. separates the shift of the risk of loss from the
passage of other incidents of title. If there had been notification to
the proper individual, then the risk of loss as to conforming goods
would have passed to Buyer upon such a tender of delivery, regardless
of Buyer's right of inspection. 13 Thus the second ground used by the
court will no longer be available. Since the passing of the risk of loss
is no longer bound to the passing of the other incidents of title, the
shift can be made dependent upon physical control of the goods rather
than upon assent.
14
If the goods had been non-conforming, the risk of loss would have
remained on the Seller, even after physical delivery, until either
Buyer accepted or Seller cured the defect.15 But, as far as the record
shows, the goods were conforming, at least under the U.C.C.16 Thus,
Buyer could not rightfully reject the goods.'7 As long as Buyer could
not rightfully reject the goods, the risk of loss would pass to him upon
proper tender.18 He may not prevent the shift of that risk unless
Seller has breached the contract in some respect, which did not occur
in this case.' 9 Thus the third ground mentioned by the court will not
be available under the U.C.C. Once delivery is properly tendered,
which means that Buyer has a reasonable opportunity to take control,
the risk of Carrier's negligence falls on Buyer. Under the statute,
20
Seller has only the duty of making a reasonable contract with Carrier,
not of overseeing Carrier's performance.
21
13. T r. CODE ANN. § 47-2-513(4) (repl. vol. 1964). This rule would apply to both
the statutory right of inspection and any right which might derive from the language of
the contract. Certainly the language in the contract clause quoted does not expressly
state that the shift of the risk of loss is postponed until after inspection.
14. See note 7 supra.
15. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-510(1) (repl. vol. 1964).
16. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-2-314(2), -504 (repl. vol. 1964). Seller made a
reasonable contract with Carrier. Further, it is doubtful that the entire barge would be
considered "a container." UNmoa COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, comment 10. The
result should be the same under the Sales Act, but see note 8 supra.
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-601 (repl. vol. 1964).
18. TENN. CODE ANN'. § 47-2-510(1) (repl. vol. 1964). UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-510, comment 1. Seller probably could not make a proper tender of delivery on
Sunday, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-503(1) (a) (repl. vol. 1964), unless Buyer had a work
crew on duty that day, which seems not to have been the case. 372 S.W.2d at 439-40.
Thus the risk of loss would not have passed to Buyer, but this would not be due to
any leak in the barges.
19. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-510(1) (repl. vol. 1964); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-510, comment 1.
20. The contract may, of course, expressly impose additional duties on Seller, or
relieve him of the statutory duties.
21. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-504(a) (repl. vol. 1964). This includes providing full





In a sale of a bean packaging machine, Seller expressly warranted
in one sentence that the machine would produce commercially ac-
ceptable packages and disclaimed all liability for damages due to
breach of that warranty in the next sentence.2 When the machine
produced defective packages and Buyer was forced to repossess large
quantities of beans, the Tennessee courts were called upon to construe
the "no damage" clause.23
Both parties were merchants, and the trial court held that there
was no fraud or overreaching in the formation of the contract; but
it did find that the clause was not available as a defense (1) because
it denied buyer any effective remedy for breach of warranty; and (2)
because it was inconsistent with the express warranty in the sentence
preceding it, making the entire paragraph ambiguous. The appellate
court reversed, holding that several other remedies were available,
even though Buyer could not claim damages.24 As long as some
remedy was available, the "no damage" clause was held to be con-
sistent with the express warranty, and therefore was effective. The
court was incorrect in stating that Buyer had several other remedies-
only one effective remedy remained for breach of warranty; Buyer
could rescind the sale.2 The court's basic point remains valid, how-
ever; Buyer had an effective remedy, so that the express warranty was
not entirely illusory.
Under the U.C.C., the "no damage" clause might be considered
a limitation of remedy under section 2-719, if the language were
considered sufficiently explicit, which is doubtful.26 As such, the clause
22. Seller also in one sentence guaranteed the machine against mechanical defects
for one year and in the next sentence limited its obligation under that guarantee to
replacing defective parts at Seller's factory.
23. Hayssen Co. v. Donelson & Poston, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 489 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1962).
24. Id. at 495.
25. See TruNr. CODE ANN. § 47-1269 (1956). Subsection (a) allows recoupment to
diminish the price, which is what Buyer tried to do in this case and failed. Subsection
(b) allows an action for damages, which is expressly prohibited by the clause. Sub-
section (c) allows rejection of the goods, but Buyer had to accept and install the
machine before the breach could become apparent. Therefore, subsection (d), which
allows rescission, is the only available remedy.
26. TENN. CODE, ANN. § 47-2-719(1)(a) (repl. vol. 1964). One problem would be
that this section, by its terms, applies only to clauses which "substitute" a remedy for
the statutory remedies, or "limit or alter the measure of damages." The clause in the
present case did none of these. It merely disclaimed liability for any damages without
expressly providing a substitute remedy. Yet none of the language used in the various
non-liability clauses would qualify as a disclaimer of all liability for implied warranties,
because the language is too ambiguous. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316 (repl. vol. 1964).
A second problem would be that the clause does not specifically prohibit the setting up
1964]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
may not limit or modify the remedial provisions of that statute in an
unconscionable manner.27 The U.C.C. does not define "unconscion-
able," so case law must be consulted in determining whether a clause
meets this test. But the court did not consider whether the clause
in the present case was unconscionable, except to acknowledge the
trial court's finding of no fraud or overreaching, which might be in-
applicable under the appellate court's different interpretation of the
contract. 8 There is authority in this state,29 and in others,30 that such
a clause is invalid, at least in sales to the consuming public. Since
the court did not discuss the point, it did not reconcile its views with
any of the prior authority. This disregard may be based on the fact
that the parties were merchants,3' but it may also indicate a division
of opinion between the courts of appeal as to the general validity of
disclaimer and "no damage" clauses. However, neither reading of the
case precludes a future holding that such a clause is invalid under
the U.C.C., even between merchants, 32 because the U.C.C. allows the
courts to pass directly on the question of unconscionability, rather
than requiring manipulation of other, indirectly related, legal con-
cepts, such as fraud.
33
of the breach of warranty by way of recoupment to deduct from the price under T:NN.
CODE Am. § 47-2-717 (repl. vol. 1964). Cf. note 24 supra; (repl. vol. 1964). UNrIFonm
CosNrvCLAM CODE § 2-719.
27. Tm N. CODE ANN. § 47-2-719, comment 1 (repl. vol. 1964).
28. Reliance on the trial court's finding may be misplaced. The appellate court con-
cluded that the trial court misread the contract language. Therefore, the trial court
found only that there was no fraud or overreaching if the "no damage" clause bad only
a limited effect. It would seem that the case should have been remanded for a
determination as to whether there was fraud or overreaching if the contract was given
the appellate court's interpretation; a point which was never decided by the trial
court.
29. General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (M.S.
1960).
30. The leading case is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960). Among the features of the clause criticized by the Henningsen court,
the most important is that the form of expression used gives insufficient notice that
the Buyer is yielding most of his basic rights under the contract. The paragraph is
labelled a warranty, but is in fact a disclaimer of liability for damages. It promises
much, but gives little and withdraws more. Whether the full meaning of the present
clause, as interpreted by the appellate court, was appreciated by the merchant buyer
was not decided by either court. See note 28 supra. For a discussion of the illusory
character of the guarantee, see 32 N.J. at 370-78, 161 A.2d at 76-80.
31. See TrErN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-719(3) (rep]. vol. 1964), where a distinction is
made as to the validity of limitations on recovery of consequential damages by a mer-
chant and by the consuming public. The clause in the present case does not, however,
merely withdraw the power to recover consequential damages, but withdraws the power
to collect any damages.
32. Such a holding could be grounded either on the ambiguities of the clause's
language, see note 26 supra, or on the more general objection that such a clause is
unconscionable under the type of reasoning used in Dodson, supra note 29, or Henning-
sen, supra note 30.




Buyer purchased a "take out"as order of food from a drive-in restau-
rant. The food allegedly caused Buyer and his wife to become sick,
and they sued Seller for damages under a breach of warranty theory.s
The Tennessee court held that no warranty recovery was available
and directed a verdict for Seller.36 The appellate court first reasoned
that statutory warranties were available only in sales transactions, and
that restaurateurs usually "serve" food for immediate consumption on
the premises, which is not a "sale." It further reasoned that, even
though this particular food was not served for immediate consumption
on the premises, since it was a "take out" order, there still had been no
sale because Seller's establishment was maintained for the purpose of
selling food to be consumed on the premises.
37
The result itself is of little importance because it is expressly
overturned by the U.C.C. as of July 1, 19 64 .38 It does, however, show
an unhealthy antagonism by the court toward both warranty protec-
tion to the consuming public and use of analogies drawn from statu-
tory provisions. In order to maintain the distinction between "served"
food and "sold" food, the court must be more interested in observing
technicalities than in making sense. Preservation of such a distinction
is contrary to all of the recent decisions on the issue.39 It is also
opposed to any reasoning process which examines the underlying
policies for warranty protection in this area.4° The health of the
person who obtains food at a drive-in restaurant would seem no less
important than the health of a person who obtains food at a super-
market. The former may be protected by either a "sale" warranty or
by an analogous "service warranty. The fact that sales warranties are
34. The food was delivered in a paper sack and wrapped in white paper, at the
side door of the drive-in. The court found that it was delivered "to be eaten off the
premises."
35. Buyer also sued in tort for negligence. However, neither court found any evi-
dence of negligence by Seller.
36. Walton v. Guthrie, 362 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
37. Id. at 44. Such a statement is directly contrary to Seller's testimony that he
did "sell food to customers to be eaten away from the premises." Id. at 43.
38. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-314(1) (repl. vol. 1964). Buyer's wife would also be
able to recover for her injuries. Any possible privity problems in such a recovery are
obviated by TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-318 (1956).
39. See, e.g., Kyle v. Swift & Co., 229 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1956); Zorinski v. American
Legion, 163 Neb. 212, 79 N.W.2d 172 (1956); Sorfman v. Denham, 37 N.J. 304, 181
A.2d 168 (1962) (modifying the prior New Jersey rule); Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp.,
10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960). See also Conn. Pub. Acts 1951, No. 318,
changing the prior Connecticut case law. This new statutory rule was carried forward
in the U.C.C., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a (1963 Supp.). For pre-1948 cases, which do
show a split of authority, but with a majority of decisions allowing warranty recovery,
see Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 1027,1034,1056 (1949).
40. See Note, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 141, and authorities cited therein.
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of statutory origin should not prevent the exchange of ideas and
authority between sales and non-sales cases. 4'
Further, when the court holds that this transaction was not a "sale,"
it ignores the technicalities involved as well as any reasoning process,
for this transaction was obviously a sale for consumption off the
premises.4 Even though this Seller may well have in most cases
"served" food for consumption on the premises, in this particular
transaction he was willing to make extra money by venturing outside
this normal pattern.43 While undertaking this extra venture, Seller
should be held to subject himself to the sales warranty liabilities
which normally attach to the contract he actually made. The Sales
Act does not make the distinctions relied on by the court.
It is to be hoped that the court will show more understanding of
the purposes which are sought to be achieved when it construes the
U.C.C. In particular, it is hoped that the court will look to cases from
other jurisdictions when construing a supposedly uniform statute. In
this case it did not, and proclaimed a decision contrary to the law in
a vast majority of other Sales Act jurisdictions," even though no
Tennessee case required the result reached by the court. If such
methods are continued, Tennessee will soon again have non-uniform
commercial law, regardless of its enactment of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
41. See Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HA v. L. REv. 4, at 12-14
(1936); Note, 2 VAsND. L. REv. 675 (1949). See also Farnsworth, Implied Warranties
of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoLuls!. L. REv. 653, 654, 667 (1957); Ferson,
Agency to Make Warranties, 5 VArND. L. REv. 1 (1951); Landis, Statutes and the
Sources of Law, HARvARD LEGAL EssAYs 213 (1934); Note, 26 COLum. L. REv. 744
(1926). This same point was not recognized by the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Redmon v. U-Haul Co., 358 S.W.2d 300 (Tenn. 1962). See Spanogle, Commercial
Transactions and Personal Property-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. REV. 637, at
638-43 (1963).
42. Compare the reasoning in Sorfman v. Denham, supra note 39, wherein cafeterias
were held to sell food, not serve it.
43. See note 34 supra. Further, "take out" sales seem to have been a recognized
part of Seller's business. See note 37 supra.
44. See notes 39 and 40 supra and accompanying text.
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